Although now possible, no European state is competing for incorporations and this is unlikely to happen in a general fashion. In this paper I argue that, however, the possibility that one state competes for one specific segment of the market for incorporations should not be ruled out altogether. As has happened with Nevada in the U.S., a state could seek to attract companies that are looking for a very protective legal environment for their directors, officers and shareholders. Given the importance of enforcement, I argue that states could compete by capitalising on the inefficiency of their courts, rather than by changing the law on the books. The fact that no investment is necessary would change the perspective on incentives of states to compete: a very small incentive is needed, if the costs are negligible. I also take into account the possible drawbacks of such competition and the reaction other states could have.
W o r k i n g P a p e r s D e p a r t m e n t o f E c o n o m i c s C a ' F o s c a r i U n i v e r s i t y o f V e n i c e N o . 1 2 / W P / 2 0 1 6 ISSN 1827-3580
The Working Paper Series is available only on line (http://www.unive.it/nqcontent.cfm?a_id=86302)
For editorial correspondence, please contact: wp.dse@unive.it
The "Delaware effect" in the EU.
Ever since the beginning of the European Community, the possibility (or, rather, in the most common perspective, the risk or actually the fear) that there would be a "Delaware effect" in European company law was widespread and clear.
Although generically described as such, various possible phenomena went under this label. In the first place -which also went under the "level playing field" narrative -it was believed that companies regulated by "laxer" states would have an undue advantage when carrying out business in other member
States under the principles of freedom of establishment or of freedom to provide services. Companies organised under some kind of "laxer" law of their "true"
home member state -the state in which not only they were organised, but also carried out most of their business -would have an unfair advantage over hostmember-state companies when operating cross border either under the freedom to provide services regime or under the freedom to establish branches (Wouters 2000; Gelter 2015 ). This view is clearly and purely protectionist, insofar as it singles out one kind of competitive advantage (company law of the home member state) and seeks to discriminate on the basis of this, whereas it does not with regard to other possible advantages connected with being regulated by a "better" home member state.
In the second place, the "Delaware effect" label included the risk of regulatory arbitrage 1 by European companies, once it was accepted -sometimes 1 It should be noticed that, albeit the distinction between regulatory arbitrage and regulatory competition is well established in English language literature, not so in some Italian literature, where the two concepts are sometimes made to overlap. See, e.g., Miola 2001, p. 339, note 43; Di Cataldo 2015, pp. 384-386 (who actually questions the issue of whether "(corporate) law matters", obtorto collo -that mutual recognition is the law of the land (Johnston 2009 , Gelter 2015 . The fear was that, once given the possibility to organise under the law of whatever State of choice, companies would flee "stricter" states in order to avoid some undesirable features of their home states, such as, typically, rules mandating employee participation (co-determination), rules deemed to protect creditors and mandatory provisions on financial structure and corporate governance.
In the third place, the label can apply (more correctly) to the idea of one member state starting to compete for incorporations, thus actively trying to lure companies and businesses of other member states to organise under the law of the first state.
As is well known, while the first kind of competitive effect has existed, in essence, since the Treaty of Rome, the second and third cases became possible only in the past two decades. With a series of decisions, starting in 1999 with the Centros case (Court of Justice, 9 March 1999, case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. c.
Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen), and then in subsequent years 2 , the European Court of Justice made it compulsory for member states to recognise companies as does Pernazza 2015, pp. 476 and 478; compare Enriques 2004, p. 78, note 11; Perrone 2001 Perrone , p. 1292 . For a recent and broad account of the issues surrounding competition for incorporations see Kahan, 2014. 2 For a discussion of the Court's decisions see, e.g., Mucciarelli 2010, pp. 88-108; Johnston 2009, pp. 152-165; Gelter 2015, pp. 4-29; Armour and Ringe 2010, pp. 6-16 . Before Centros, the Court had already announced its new line of cases with the Segers case (1986), which was, however, widely ignored, or even consciously downplayed, by authors (Court of Justice, 10 July 1986, case n. 79/85, Segers c. Bestuur Bedrijfsvereniging Voor Bank-en Verzekeringswezen; see Halbhuber, 2001 Halbhuber, , pp. 1387 Halbhuber, -1389 . The year after Segers, the Court issued a new decision, which was read in the sense that the Court considered the Treaty freedoms compatible with the "real seat" doctrine, which enabled states to apply the law of the state where the company had its "real seat", usually considering such the place where the company was headquartered or carried out its main operations (but, as the Überseering case showed, other criteria were also applied): Taking into consideration the fact that enforcement is as important as substantive law, if not more, the paper considers the possibility that, instead of modifying the law on the books, which may not be politically feasible, states could instead capitalise on the inefficiency of their judiciary; in this they may be actually helped by the European rules on civil jurisdiction.
The fact that no investment is necessary also changes the perspective on incentives of states to compete: a very small incentive is needed, if the costs are negligible.
Finally, the paper takes into account possible drawbacks of such a competition and the reaction other states could have.
The paper takes no position on whether such possible form of competition leads to desirable outcomes. (Barzuza 2012; Ribstein 2011-2012) .
State competition for incorporations
One can, however, assume that this is highly unlikely, especially in the EU. No state started off in the competition after Centros, although history teaches that the first mover's advantage is great (Kamar 2005 (Kamar -2006 (Kamar , p. 1765 . At the height of the "foreign limited" fever, England clearly refused to accept the role of the incorporation state of Europe, by not easing compliance costs, which caused many foreign limited companies to cease their English experience (Ringe 2013, pp. 262-263) .
The same conclusion is perhaps not so obvious if one looks at competition with the perspective to compete in a specific market segment Kamar 2002-2003) . What could happen is that states could seek to attract one specific segment of the market, e.g. those companies that are looking for protection for directors, offices and shareholders, or to escape from one or more specific features of a national law.
This is precisely what happened in Nevada. Nevada offers a law that limits significantly liability risk for directors and officers.
Firstly, as compared to Delaware, which enables opting out of the duty of care under § 102(b)(7), in Nevada the no-liability for duty of care is the default rule. One could see this as trivial, given that opting out of the duty of care is a standard practice for U.S. corporations incorporated both in Delaware (Holland 2008 (Holland -2009 Yeager 2014 Yeager -2015 and in other states (Hamermesh 1999 (Hamermesh -2000 . More importantly, however, the no-liability rule in Nevada for breach of duty of care also applies to officers, while in Delaware it does not (Barzuza 2012; Ribstein 2011-2012) .
Secondly, with respect to the duty of loyalty, while in Delaware directors and officers may be held liable for breach of duty of loyalty for failing to act in good faith, extracting improper personal benefits, intentional misconduct and fraud, or a knowing violation of law, in Nevada liability arises only if there is "both a breach of the duty of loyalty and intentional misconduct, fraud or a knowing violation of law" (Barzuza 2012 ).
To be sure, it is highly improbable that any European state -even one of the smallest ones -would be willing to explicitly change its law (inevitably by means of a statute) in order to follow in Nevada's footsteps 8 , which may even require derogating from general principles of law, as it would in Italy (for example, according to Art. 1229 Civil Code, it is not possible to exclude by contract liability for intentional misconduct and gross negligence). It would most likely be politically unfeasible, also because the gains would be low, although perhaps not insignificant. Nevada was able to go down this road because it has a long tradition of tolerance in many fields and stood to gain from incorporation taxes, which cannot happen in the EU.
It is commonly understood that the scope of company law in the EU is broader than that of the U.S. In the U.S, company law almost only refers to the relationship among managers, directors and shareholders (including relationships between controlling and minority shareholders). In contrast, in the EU some aspects of company law include protection of creditors and employees (Mucciarelli 2011 (Mucciarelli -2012 . This gives rise to issues of opportunistic behaviour in reincorporations that may be more intense in Europe than in the U.S. However, from the perspective of possible competition via some form of market segmentation, the fact that the scope of company law in Europe is not only 2014, pp. 200-203. broader than that in the U.S., but also different from state to state -with the consequence that "law products" are not properly comparable -becomes a factor in favour of competition, rather than a factor that discourages it (see Perrone 2001, of the opposite opinion that the absence of comparability may hinder competition).
What kind of law?
The duplicity of the concept of "laxity", with regard to a "liability-free" jurisdiction.
Rules making it easier for directors and officers to escape liability can be looked at in different ways. The first perspective is that they give undue or excessive protection to directors and officers and are, therefore, just the product of the agency problem between directors and shareholders. The issue of inefficient reincorporations has been studied also beyond reincorporations to Nevada, and it has been argued that directors have various ways to circumvent shareholders or induce them to vote in favour of reincorporations, for example by bundling "good"
and "bad" charter amendments (Bebchuk 1992, p. 1475 (see also, in more general terms on charter amendments, Bebchuk 1989)). This framework fits one account of the Nevada experience: Barzuza found evidence of the fact that firms reincorporating in Nevada were "high-agency-cost" companies because they tended to restate financial statements more often than average (Barzuza 2012, pp. 988-992 10 Drawing another example from Italy, delay in filing for insolvency, just knowingly (not intentionally) is punished with up to two years of imprisonment (Art. 217(1), n. 4, Bankruptcy Act). It should be noticed that seldom does any director actually go to jail for such a crime, or even for much more serious economic crimes, due to the inefficiency of the Italian criminal court system; even when someone is convicted, parole is the norm and there are many ways offenders avoid actually serving in prison. This makes criminal law in Italy very harsh on occasional offenders, such as professionals, who suffer the stigma and the cost of the trial, but easy on real crooks, who will basically never face any jail time if not for really egregious cases. 11 See the relevant rules in Nevada Revised Statutes, Chapter 78 -Private corporations: § 78.746 Action against stockholder by judgment creditor; limitations. 1. On application to a court of competent jurisdiction by any judgment creditor of a stockholder, the court may charge the stockholder's stock with payment of the unsatisfied amount of the judgment with interest. To the extent so charged, the judgment creditor has only the rights of an assignee of the stockholder's stock.
2. Subject to the provisions of NRS 78.747, this section: (a) Provides the exclusive remedy by which a judgment creditor of a stockholder or an assignee of a stockholder may satisfy a judgment out of the stock of the judgment debtor. No other remedy, including, without limitation, foreclosure on the stockholder's stock or a court order for directions, accounts and inquiries that the debtor or stockholder might have made, is available to the judgment creditor società in nome collettivo -in which partners, however, are jointly and severally liable for the partnership's debts, so this is not a proper alternative to a company) 12 .
This extreme affirmative asset partitioning may not make any efficiency, or equitable, sense when there is a sole shareholder or when the law allows for corporations to hold non-business assets, and even more so when the company has a sole shareholder and holds non-business assets.
State competition in a low-liability segment.

The importance of non-enforcement.
Nevada's legislators were wary of attracting "scoundrels" and "sleazeballs" (Barzuza 2012) . It may, indeed, be true that explicitly taking care of people aiming at escaping liability is politically infeasible. However, there is a material difference between adopting a statute that explicitly protects corporate tortfeasors and subtly suggesting to tortfeasors that incorporating in that state is a good idea.
It should also be considered that the assumption underlying the idea that states are unwilling to compete is that the benefits are modest as compared to costs: states themselves should take active steps to compete and they should offer attempting to satisfy the judgment out of the judgment debtor's interest in the corporation, and no other remedy may be ordered by a court.
[…] 3. As used in this section, "rights of an assignee" means the rights to receive the share of the distributions or dividends paid by the corporation to which the judgment debtor would otherwise be entitled. The term does not include the rights to participate in the management of the business or affairs of the corporation or to become a director of the corporation. some attractive feature to attract incorporations; such features, such as judicial infrastructure, may be complex and costly to set up and maintain 13 .
It is now widely recognised that Delaware has a competitive edge (and a dominant position) because it offers not only good law, but also competent, specialised and efficient judges; there are network and learning effects connected to being incorporated in Delaware; and lawyers and parties are familiar with Delaware law. These characteristics are assets that are difficult and lengthy to replicate, and no state has enough incentives to engage in a race. For example, establishing a specialised court may prove politically or legally complex; possible competitors will always lag behind in creating network effects because these tend to increase when the size of the network itself increases (Manesh 2011 ; see also Kamar 2002-2003) .
Basically, law cannot be measured only on the books, but also based on its enforcement; hence the importance of infrastructure. If Delaware is inimitable because of its infrastructure, we must now invert the perspective and ask ourselves whether there are any states that are inimitable due to their lack of enforcement. We would then find some good candidates for our competition 14 .
About a decade ago, in the wake of the Centros decision, it was argued that States could more effectively compete by "unbundling" substantive law from adjudication and consigning adjudication to arbitration (Kirchner et al. 2005) .
Setting aside issues of arbitration in general and in company law litigation 13 However, the cost is perhaps overestimated, at least according to Delaware's budget for the Court of chancery: see Kamar 2002-2003, pp. 725-726 compete putting its inefficient justice on the line could modify, rather than substantive company law, its private international law provisions on companies; it is unlikely that clarifying what "seat" means under Art. 24(2) of the regulation could spark serious political opposition. Also, Art. 24(2) expressly disregards the otherwise concurrent criterion of the domicile of parties; hence, Art. 63, concerning where a company is deemed to be domiciled, which could foster "real seat" interpretations of Art. 24(2), does not apply 16 . Indeed, the Court of Justice takes a narrow approach to Art. 24(2); this has been criticised, however, on the basis of the correct remark that the aim of the provision is to connect substantive law with its proper forum (Benedettelli 2015, p. 33) . The provision is now § 115 of Del. GCL:
It is noteworthy that the
Forum selection provisions. The certificate of incorporation or the bylaws may require, consistent with applicable jurisdictional requirements, that any or all internal corporate claims shall be brought solely and exclusively in any or all of the courts in this State, and no provision of the certificate of incorporation or the bylaws may prohibit bringing such claims in the courts of this State. "Internal corporate claims" means claims, including claims in the right of the corporation, (i) that are based upon a violation of a duty by a current or former director or officer or stockholder in such capacity, or (ii) as to which this title confers jurisdiction upon the Court of Chancery.
the value of Delaware's "package" of substantive law and enforcement (Ventoruzzo 2015b ) that was threatened by multijurisdictional litigation (Armour et al. 2012) , there are sound reasons, even more so in a context of very different legal traditions and structures as Europe, to bind substantive law to adjudication. Substantive rules should be thought in the context of their enforcement; so, for example, nominally strict bright-line rules, perhaps with burden shifting, may prove too harsh if courts are very efficient, the social norm is slanted towards honesty and plaintiffs have ample discovery powers, but may set a correct standard of enforcement if courts are slow and inefficient, there is no social (nor legal) sanction against lying, and no access to inside information is available to plaintiffs 18 .
States' incentives to compete.
The fact that states would be capitalizing on their inefficiencies changes incentives of the states to compete, because there is nothing, or very little, on the "cost" side in the cost/benefit analysis.
The two main reasons why states are said to compete are incorporation taxes and additional business for professionals in the field of incorporations, registered agents, lawyers, accountants, tax advisors and the like. As said above, we can rule out the tax incentive, due to legal constraints that are definitely unlikely to change. 18 The situation referred to in the text was, until about end of the Nineties, the case of Italy in suits by trustees in bankruptcy against directors for damages caused by the late filing for bankruptcy or for continuing trading notwithstanding the loss of capital: the trustee could seek damages equal to the entire amount of debts not covered by the estate. This view was later overturned, in favour or a more causal-oriented approach to the determination of damages, but the criterion still resurfaces in some circumstances (see Court of Cassation, en banc, May 15, 2015, No. 9100, for a comprehensive reconstruction of the issue).
Business for professionals is a controversial incentive. Some believe that it is an excellent excuse to attract incorporations (Dammann 2004; Deakin 2001) , although -as regards choosing Delaware -the advantage is limited, because corporate lawyers all around the U.S. are trained in Delaware law Kamar 2002-2003) 19 , which is actually one of the reasons why they suggest Delaware as a place to incorporate (Daines 2002; Broughman and Ibrahim 2015) .
In the European context, a similar argument was used, in future projection, referring to legal advice for listed companies, who tend to be clients of international law firms, which have no specific incentive to lobby for the states to compete (Enriques 2004a (Enriques , p. 1264 . Others have argued, instead, that in the European context there would be a great incentive for local lawyers, because they would stand to gain as counsel for the clients without being open to any immediate competition, given the very high costs of training in a completely different jurisdiction (Dammann 2004, p. 506 ).
On another note, the fact that companies would have to hire local counsel not only for clerical paperwork but for proper representation could be a significant hindrance to place-of-business lawyers and accountants to suggest reincorporating in the low-liability state, given that they would stand to possibly lose some business from the client (Dammann 2004) . The company, however, will continue to need legal services both in their state of incorporation (mainly for litigation) and in the state where it is headquartered. Possibly, there may be some duplicative work (and, thus, higher legal and similar expenses), but this would come as a price to pay to escape liability 20 . Also, one should consider the possibility that the original lawyers may share in some of the profits of the lawyers of the state of incorporation, e.g. by opening offices in association with local lawyers. There is no serious risk for either ones to be outplaced by each other, because of the very specific knowledge needed to advise on the laws of different European states.
On balance, the possibility of more work for local lawyers may be enough to trigger competition, given that there are no significant (visible) costs to be borne to attract incorporations.
There may be, indeed, some costs arising from attracting incorporations (and related litigation). Two points should be made in this regard.
First, in spite of the fact that the discussion here is about small companies, even small company cases tend to be worth more than the average civil claim.
Hence, the marginal cost of handling the case by state courts -which is subsidised by the state -may be offset, at least in part, by court fees 21 . It should be noted that there is no European law constraint on court fees and raising court 20 See also Barzuza 2015, for the claim that the main determinant of Nevada choice is managers' preference for legal protection when their home state (which is the preferred option) is not a viable venue. The argument could be adapted to small companies in Europe substituting owners, or controlling shareholders, to managers. 21 In Italy, for example, any case in company law worth more than euro 520,000 requires payment of a court fee of euro 3,372, plus another euro 1,686 if one also seeks seizure or injunctive relief. Any director liability case will induce defendants to call in court their insurers, hence paying each another court fee of the same amount. In the case an action is brought to void or annul a company decision, the plaintiff should be prepared to pay the same amount various times, because the company may re-issue the same decision, thus forcing multiple cases to be file.
In England, court fees are in the region of 5% of the claim, capped at £ 10,000 when the claim is worth gov.uk (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/fees-for-civil-and-family-courts/court-fees-for-thehigh-court-county-court-and-family-court) (last accessed April 4 th , 2016).
See also https://e-justice.europa.eu/content_costs_of_proceedings-37-en.do (last accessed April 4 th , 2016) for reference to court fees of other European countries (which are usually, however, difficult to ascertain for the layman).
fees could actually be a move in enhancing the states "law product", because it advantages defendants (which are usually companies) at the expense -at least, the immediate expense -of plaintiffs 22 .
Second, attracting incorporations and ensuing litigation may be an expendable point in political discourse because the gains are visible (court fees, more business for local lawyers), whereas the costs (the marginal costs of more units of litigation) are not easily quantified and detected. It could also be popular with judges, who would gain the prestige of company-law cases, without this interfering at all -as the Italian experience recounts -with speeding up justice 23 .
Finally, for companies other than small family businesses, states could try to attract incorporations in order to lure companies to establish their "real seat" in a fiscal sense: the domicile, usually the place of incorporation or the place where highest-level corporate decisions are taken (Enriques 2004b) . For example, the OECD Model convention with respect to taxes on income and on capital, Art. 4(3), refers to "the State in which its place of effective management is situated" to identify the principal state of taxation in case a company is considered a resident of different states; Italian law defines "resident" companies as companies having 22 Gelter 2012 downplays court fees as a factor hindering derivative actions but recognises that this may be a "plausible" factor in some cases (869). Here suffice to say that it may be yet another factor making it more burdensome for plaintiffs to attack the company or its directors and officers. 23 Court inefficiency could lead to fewer cases only if the courts are so inefficient that it becomes completely pointless to file a lawsuit, which is not a likely scenario in any EU member state. Court inefficiency could actually cause more cases to be filed if the plaintiff seeks alternative venues for relief given the delay in obtaining a judgment. their statutory seat or place of management or principal place of business in the State 24 .
Possible drawbacks for local businesses.
Having slow courts is a big problem for the economy, but it is not an easily solved problem 25 . What I argued above is not that states would want to keep justice slow in order to attract incorporations, of course, but that states may want to make the most of their inefficiency 26 .
A different issue would arise, instead, if the path chosen by the state is to actively enter the market segment of low-liability companies with a dedicated effort to enact lax substantive laws. Local entrepreneurs choosing, as is usual, their home jurisdiction to incorporate would be unable to distinguish themselves from crooks of all over Europe (See Ringe 2013 about reputation costs of the use of a foreign entity; in this case, it would be vice-versa).
The fact that substantive laws only provide for default protection would not ease the issue, because the social recognisability of companies would suffer from the "lax" base-model. Rather, the law could provide for a specific type of "lax" company. Anyone wanting to incorporate in the state without looking for undue protection would incorporate under a different form. Special rules should make it difficult (e.g. with supermajority or majority-of-minority requirements, for the protection of shareholders, or notice to creditors) to transform the "standard" company to a "low-liability" company, in order to avoid "bait and switch" behaviours with minority shareholder and creditors within the stateexactly the same ones which could happen through reincorporation.
Mainly, but perhaps not just, a matter of mid-stream reincorporation.
Is there a problem with liability-free jurisdictions and liability-free directors and shareholders? Minority shareholders of a company incorporated in a "standard" jurisdiction negotiate adequate protections (they may introduce in the charter more stringent liability rules, provide for supermajority provisions, etc.). As far as creditors are concerned, one could argue that, if creditors know that the company they are dealing with is incorporated under a very lax law, they will have to take this aspect into account when entering into the transaction. This, of course, leaves out, in the first place, non-adjusting creditors, such as tort creditors and, especially, statutory creditors such as the state for taxes and public bodies entrusted with social security for compulsory contributions, and may warrant some sort of "federal" intervention which, in the EU, mainly takes the form of directives. On the other hand, there are means of collaboration among states (for example for tax reasons) and there are instruments that should make it easier for creditors to recover also from foreign companies. Of course, there are information and transaction costs which may make freedom of establishment in itself suboptimal; we have to take into account that this is, however, the law as it is was forged by the ECG.
Midstream reincorporation, on the other hand, multiplies enormously the potential for opportunistic behaviour (Bebchuk 1992; Enriques and Gelter 2006; Mucciarelli 2011 Mucciarelli -2012 . One could argue that shareholders and creditors of closely-held companies can fend for themselves and negotiate adequate provisions in the articles of incorporation or in the debt covenants, as the case may be. It should be noticed that the directive 2005/56/EC on cross-border mergers, already mentioned above, obliges states to afford protection to creditors in the same way as they do for domestic mergers, whereas states only have the option to "adopt provisions designed to ensure appropriate protection for minority members who have opposed the cross-border merger" (Art. 4 (2)).
Negotiating adequate provisions may not always be possible. Shareholders could have not anticipated the possibility of seat transfer or could find themselves for the first time in such circumstances due to supervening events.
Lack of anticipation may not be the case under Italian law, given that seat transfer has always been expressly taken into account by the law in order to grant appraisal rights to an objecting shareholder. This could happen, instead, for example in real-seat jurisdictions for companies incorporated before Centros or in the immediately subsequent years, when probably the risk of reincorporations had not settled yet. One should also not disregard the fact that entrepreneurs choosing low-cost entities such as LLCs should not be expected to hire specialist counsel and, until midstream incorporation has become a widespread risk, boilerplate clauses may not capture, and prevent, such possibility.
Or, shareholders may have inherited their shares, rather than bought them: cases in which the entrepreneur has not planned his succession or has failed to do so effectively may become cases in which, due to fragmentation of shareholdings among the heirs, protections devised in the certificate of incorporation (such as supermajority requirements) may not be effective any more. Given the social and economic relevance the aspect of succession in business has gained, at least in ageing economies as Italy, it would be a mistake to disregard this issue as trivial.
As regards creditors, the risk posed by midstream reincorporation for creditors is, indeed, certainly greater. Leaving aside non-adjusting creditors and information and transaction costs for smaller creditors, such as trade creditors, and leaving aside also "weaker" creditors, such as employees or suppliers with only one or very few customers, also sophisticated, adjusting creditors may not be immune from reincorporations.
Creditors may protect themselves with covenants, which may be more effective than rights available under domestic laws implementing directive 2005/56/EC (or specific laws tackling direct transfer of the seat) but the problem is that multijurisdictional litigation will almost inevitably ensue in the event of a covenant breach. Once the company "flees" abroad, even if breaching a covenant, it will almost certainly be necessary, notwithstanding any forum selection clause in the contract, to sue also in the state of incorporation, given the rules under Regulation Brussels I-bis. No covenant seems able to prevent multijurisdictional litigation.
Even more opportunistic potential is involved in reincorporation decisions taken to protect the owners of the firm from their personal creditors. Shifting from a state which allows foreclosure on shares to one which only allows a charging order, or to a state which allows bearer shares, may radically affect the ability of personal creditors to pursue their credit.
The other states' reaction.
The risk of lowering the standard of law in the U.S. is federal intervention (Bebchuk 1992 States could devise hindrances to reincorporations abroad, but it would be extremely difficult, as a matter of law, to distinguish the transfer of the seat to one place or to the other one. As mentioned above, the Court of Justice seems to 27 See now Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on insolvency proceedings. The Regulation now explicitly states that there is no presumption that the COMI is where the registered office is located if the transfer of the office has occurred less than three months before the filing for insolvency (Art. 3(1), second par.: "In the case of a company or legal person, the place of the registered office shall be presumed to be the centre of its main interests in the absence of proof to the contrary. That presumption shall only apply if the registered office has not been moved to another Member State within the 3-month period prior to the request for the opening of insolvency proceedings"). Company provided for 28 , given that this kind of provision tends to be unable to discriminate "good" and "bad" motives for reincorporation or seat transfer.
The same would be for reincorporation via a cross-border merger: states can restrict cross-border mergers only to the extent they restrict domestic ones 29 , which would be an overreaching measure just to avoid a potentially opportunistic reincorporation abroad.
States could react by applying some kind of protective measure, which should comply with the Gebhard test. It is not easy to imagine what kind of measure this could be. Could the law state that, for any operation carried out or decided within its territory, one specific standard of care or loyalty applies? This 28 See the (now withdrawn) Proposal for a Council Regulation on the statute for a European private company (COM/2008/0396 final), which had a similar take the transfer of the seat of insolvent companies. After stating that " [t] he registered office of an SPE may be transferred to another Member State in accordance with this Chapter" (Art. 35(1)), it clarified that "Paragraph 1 shall not apply to SPEs against which proceedings for winding-up, liquidation, insolvency or suspension of payments have been brought, or in respect of which preventive measures have been taken by the competent authorities to avoid the opening of such proceedings" (Art. 35 (2) seems unlikely in general terms but also seems disproportionate, using one of the terms of the test.
As regards personal creditors of shareholders, the application of any measure deemed to protect "domestic" creditors would clash with the fact that the interest in a foreign company is an "asset" regulated by the law of the company and it would be extremely difficult to superimpose one set of laws on another one to this effect. Suppose, for example, that the law of the company's seat only allows for a charging order on the shares of a company, while the law of the creditor also allows foreclosure. Even if the creditor obtains foreclosure on those shares, and shares are forcibly sold or assigned, the buyer or assignee would nonetheless need the cooperation of the company to exercise the rights connected to the shares.
If the company had reincorporated in the low-liability state, the only protection for personal creditors of the shareholder could rather come from fraudulent conveyance law, with the difficulty of applying such laws to the "modification" of shares from shares of a company subject to one law to shares of a company subject to another law 30 .
A more significant possibility is the "relabelling" of company law rules as insolvency (Enriques and Gelter 2006) , labour, or tort law, so to cause them to apply not by reference to the place of incorporation but by reference to other 30 Italian courts are very liberal when construing which acts can be of prejudice for creditors, sofor example -allow for actions referring to the sale of real estate also for fair consideration, on the assumption that also a "qualitative" modification of the debtor's estate is relevant for creditors (i.e. money is easier to hide and make unavailable to creditors) (the principle is settled; see, e.g., Court of Cassation, December 12 th , 2012, No. 26151). Courts also allow actions when goods are paid into a company and thus "transformed" into a partnership interest or into shares of a company (see, e.g., Court of Cassation, October 22 nd , 2013, No. 23891) . The case in the text is, however, different, because it would imply "deconstructing", albeit in a fashion limited to the claiming creditor, the reincorporation: the company should be deemed, for purposes of the avoidance of the act, as the "old" company.
connecting factors, such as the COMI for insolvency rules, the place where business is carried out and workers employed or the place where damage was made for other rules.
There are various issues with "insolvencification", however (Enriques and Gelter 2006, pp. 449-452) , and it is probably even more difficult to make a case for other sets of rules, if they interfere with the inner governance of the company.
